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INTRODUCTION
As populist leaders gain power around the world, democratic
governments retreat, and authoritarian states gain power in the
international system,1 it is critical to find levers of resistance. Professors Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg’s masterful volume, How
Constitutional Rights Matter, offers a timely and provocative answer: let’s look to organizations as potential defenders of rights in
challenging times.2 In a world in which human rights are widely
understood as individual rights, it is high time to theorize about
how organizations can help vindicate these individual protections.
The specific thesis Chilton and Versteeg promote is that
“some rights, once constitutionalized, are harder to violate than
others.”3 Specifically, freedom of religion, the right to unionize,
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and the right to form political parties are more likely to survive
challenges.4 This is because these rights, which Chilton and Versteeg term “organizational,” have built-in advocates—religious
groups, trade unions, and political parties—available to enforce
them.5 In contrast, “individual” rights—which include both civil
rights such as freedom from torture and social rights such as the
right to education—have no built-in advocates, and are thus
harder to protect.
Chilton and Versteeg test this theory empirically, with data
from hundreds of countries over decades. Their data analysis is a
model of transparency. For each right, they compare, in easy-toread figures, countries that have the right to countries that don’t,
and then countries before and after adoption. They then present,
in figures, more sophisticated, stacked event-study specifications
with extensive controls.6 This transparent quantitative analysis
is supplemented by gripping case studies and an extensive discussion of alternative theories. We learn about President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey,
and recently deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s Myanmar, and about the (relative) success of some organized groups
at protecting core rights where others failed, even under harsh
authoritarian rule.
Chilton and Versteeg have generated foundational questions
about whether, for instance, it is even possible to classify rights
as entailing greater or lesser organizational support. They have
also paved the way toward answering, rather than avoiding,
fundamental empirical questions when the data, like the real
world, is imperfect. In this Book Review, I will first summarize
and critique this book on its own terms—as a major theoretical
and empirical contribution to the debate on when and how constitutions matter. There are, of course, many ways in which one can
debate and question the specifics of Chilton and Versteeg’s theory
(and some, but fewer ways, to question their empirics), so it is
worth pointing to these.
But at the time of a pandemic, when fundamental liberties
are curtailed around the world, the book’s core thesis about the
importance of organizations in protecting rights could not be
timelier. Around the world, scores of restrictions have been put
into place—hundreds of countries, for example, have curtailed
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freedom of movement.7 And other rights have been curtailed
through government inaction. The UN Anti-Torture mechanisms,
for example, report that tens of thousands of prisoners are known
to have contracted COVID-19,8 while UNESCO reports that in recent months over 60% of students globally have seen fundamental
rights to education curtailed due to school closures.9 And the willingness of authoritarian (and democratic) leaders to use the
pandemic to expand their powers and implement unrelated laws
and restrictions is terrifying. The pandemic offers a hard test of
Chilton and Versteeg’s theory that some rights will fare better
than others under pressure. It is to this discussion that I devote
the last part of this Book Review.
But is it the case, as Chilton and Versteeg’s theory would predict, that some resistance has been possible? Is it the case that
one type of rights—organizational rights—has been less compromised than others? This is a hard question to answer, as early on
in a pandemic it is hard to know what is temporary and what is
here to stay. That said, I believe there are strong indications that
Chilton and Versteeg’s theory about the greater resilience of organizational rights is proving prescient. Some organizational
rights—notably freedom of religion and the right to unionize, and
to a much lesser extent the right to form political parties—seem
to be, for now, somewhat less threatened than individual rights,
such as the right to free movement or the right to education. In
the pages that follow, I first explore how Chilton and Versteeg’s
book presents the pre-COVID-19 world. I then present some useful extensions to their theory for a post-COVID-19 universe, full
of significant rights restrictions.
I. WHEN DO CONSTITUTIONS MATTER? STATE, CONSTITUTION,
AND RIGHTS CHARACTERISTICS
Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg, along with many other constitutional law scholars, have long wondered whether the guarantee of rights in a constitution actually influences the government’s protection of those rights. The likely answer is “It
depends.” But what does it depend on? Chilton and Versteeg
7
See Amy Slipowitz, How COVID-19 Restrictions Have Deepened Existing Inequality,
FREEDOM HOUSE (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/NH2W-J82Y.
8
COVID-19 Exacerbates the Risk of Ill-Treatment and Torture Worldwide — UN
Experts, OFF. HIGH COMM’R, COMM. HUM. RTS. (June 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/34V6-J8PM.
9
See Education: From Disruption to Recovery, UNESCO, https://perma.cc/SPL6
-KU8Y [hereinafter UNESCO].

732

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:729

argue that it depends on the nature of the rights themselves. To
better situate Chilton and Versteeg’s theoretical contribution, I
first discuss two other variables emphasized in the literature:
characteristics of states and characteristics of constitutions.
A. Characteristics of States
The relationship between constitutions on paper and constitutions in action likely depends on state characteristics. For example, democratic and wealthy states with independent judiciaries, are more likely to respect constitutional (and all other types
of) rules. For instance, Versteeg and coauthor Professor David S.
Law examine the extent to which constitutions are mere “parchment barriers” and identify regime type and civil conflict as critical predictors of whether a constitution will be a sham constitution, or a functional guardian of rights.10 In a related significant
contribution, Professor Beth Simmons reports that it is neither in
stable autocracies nor in stable democracies that human rights
treaties make the greatest difference, but instead, in transition
states.11 In contrast, in this book, Chilton and Versteeg argue that
their “basic story—of religious groups, trade unions, and political
parties using the constitution to protect their rights—does not
necessarily depend on whether countries are democratic or have
independent courts.”12 This finding is very powerful and provocative.
B. Characteristics of Constitutions
In addition, the form of constitutions could matter, including
their scope and the number of rights they enumerate.13 In Constitutions Unentrenched, Versteeg and Professor Emily Zackin explore the question of which constitutional design mechanisms enable citizens to effectively control their government.14 The authors
compare two competing models of constitutional design. The first
model—and the one that currently dominates constitutional theory literature—is entrenchment.15 Constitutions that are

10 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863,
867, 919–22 (2013).
11 See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 153 (2009).
12 CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 10.
13 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 898.
14 See generally Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward
an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657 (2016).
15 See id. at 659–60.
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entrenched tend to be difficult to amend and contain vague principles rather than specific, comprehensive policies.16 Entrenched
constitutions are generally narrow in scope and describe only the
basic structures of government and the rights it cannot violate.17
The second model—which is developed by Versteeg and
Zackin as an alternative, competing version of constitutionalism—is un-entrenchment, or specificity. Un-entrenched constitutions are easy to amend, textually flexible, and contain highly detailed policies.18 As such, un-entrenched constitutions are broad
in scope and frequently updated so as to adapt to social, political,
and economic changes.19 Contrary to a large literature that assumes that entrenched constitutions, like the U.S. Constitution,
are superior, Versteeg and Zackin show that un-entrenched constitutions are becoming much more common, which could allow
citizens to more effectively control governmental behavior.20
C. Characteristics of Rights
The main theoretical innovation of How Constitutions Matter
is to develop a theory about which rights are more likely to be
enforced, even in states that are not advanced democracies with
stable protections.
In an earlier work, Law and Versteeg find that globally, on
average, socioeconomic and group rights are less likely to be upheld than personal integrity rights and civil and political freedoms.21 In a related work on human rights treaties, Simmons
mentions in passing that rights to religion are more likely to be
enforced than rights to fair trials because the constituency for fair
trials is likely to be small and powerless.22 But these works constitute exceptions to a general pattern in the literature—namely

16

See id. at 659.
See id.
18 See Katerina Linos & Tom Pegram, The Language of Compromise in International
Agreements, 70 INT’L ORG. 587, 613 (2016) [hereinafter Linos & Pegram, Language of Compromise] (explaining why highly precise international templates are significantly more
likely to be effective in influencing national human rights practices as compared to more
flexible templates). See generally Katerina Linos & Tom Pegram, Architects of Their Own
Making: National Human Rights Institutions and the United Nations, 38 HUM. RTS. Q.
1109 (2016); Katerina Linos & Tom Pegram, What Works in Human Rights Institutions?,
111 AM. J. INT’L L. 628 (2017).
19 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 14, at 660–61.
20 See id. at 660.
21 Law & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 916–17.
22 SIMMONS, supra note 11, at 357.
17
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that there is very little systematic study of whether constitutions
can help protect some rights, but not others.
In this book, Chilton and Versteeg adopt a novel theory—they
argue that some rights, rights that are more organizational, are
more likely to be respected because they create organizations
with the incentives and means to protect the underlying right.23
Thus, for example, labor rights are more likely to be protected
once established in a constitution because unions are likely to develop to protect these rights.24 In contrast, freedom from torture
doesn’t have an organized, natural constituency that can easily
monitor and address violations.25 These claims are important,
novel, and provocative, but they are not all this book offers. Chilton and Versteeg don’t merely propose hypotheses, or propose hypotheses and then test them, as important empirical scholarship
does. Instead, they build a theory from the ground up, stating key
assumptions and deriving from these particular hypotheses. In
the next Section, I outline (and also question) their key moves.
II. HOW ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS WORK: THE THEORETICAL
CONTRIBUTION
Chilton and Versteeg’s contribution is significant because it
is a true theory. It is a series of logically interconnected propositions, rather than a set of tangentially related or unrelated
hunches and hypotheses. This form of deductive reasoning, in
which assumptions are clearly stated, is critical. It also facilitates
empirical testing and the scientific process more generally.26 In
this deductive process, Chilton and Versteeg first explain what
constitutional rights have the potential to do in general, and then

23 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 27. See also generally Adam S. Chilton
& Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 575
(2016) [hereinafter Chilton & Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?]. Cf.
Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. 417, 429 (2015) [hereinafter Chilton & Versteeg, Torture Prohibitions] (describing data that revealed a cursory increase in the respect for the prohibition of torture
ten years after a nation’s addition of a constitutional prohibition against torture, suggesting that the prohibition against torture is not an organizational right and therefore is less
easily protected).
24 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 291.
25 See id. at 138.
26 See Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 231–35 (2017); Katerina Linos, How to Select and Develop
International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 480 (2015).
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move on to the second step, to explain the added value of
organizations.
A. The Work Constitutional Rights Do
Chilton and Versteeg envision constitutional rights not as
tight knots, binding Ulysses to the mast, but as speed bumps.27
They quote Henry Kissinger, who allegedly said, “[T]he illegal we
do immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer.”28 I
very much like this focus on the ease with which a leader can act
to suspend a protection or implement a new initiative. While
speedbumps sometimes only lead to short delays in policy implementation, at other times, a temporary change in focus permanently derails a project.
More specifically, according to Chilton and Versteeg, constitutional rights facilitate “coordination” and “collective action.”
“Coordination” is a slightly awkward term for an important concept: helping individuals understand what to think about a conflict and how to assess who is behaving correctly and who is at
fault.29 More specifically, when there is an allegation that a right
has been violated, is the government or the aggrieved party to
blame? If a community wants to protest or pray or party, and the
state shuts down these efforts, “framing grievances as rights violations” can in some contexts shift the balance of power toward
the aggrieved community.30 Chilton and Versteeg term this clarifying power of the language of rights “coordination” by analogy to
the game theoretic literature on the importance of clear rules
about which side of the road to drive on.31 Clear rules establish
which activities are permitted, from driving on the left side of the
road to practicing particular religious rites, facilitating coordination between parties in the process.
Their terminology is a bit awkward, because a key feature of
coordination games is that they have only minor distributional
consequences. At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter whether the
right or the left side of the road is chosen, as long as there is no
uncertainty. In contrast, distributional conflict is central to any
discussion about rights. We very much care about which
27

See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 12, 58.
See id. at 6 (quoting Memorandum of Conversation, Aid Cut-Off: Cyprus,
WIKILEAKS: PUB. LIB. OF U.S. DIPL. (Mar. 10, 1975), https://perma.cc/9EHD-BPMN).
29 See id. at 29–30.
30 Id. at 33.
31 Id. at 28.
28
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community will see its rights protected and which behaviors the
government will suppress. That said, any lawyer, and many
nonlawyers, would agree that clearly written and highly precise
rules specifically permitting or even requiring certain behaviors
help shift the balance of power toward the party advantaged by
the precise formulation.32 This is analogous to the concept of focal
points in coordination and other types of formal games. So this is
an important, and very plausible, first theoretical step in a model
about why constitutional rights matter.
“Collective action” is the second important task rights help
facilitate, according to Chilton and Versteeg. States can crush individuals however precisely their rights are enumerated—the
power asymmetry is too large. Indeed, as Chilton and Versteeg
put it, “[g]overnments are not rattled by small groups of protesters; it is large crowds that make them wary.”33 They cite research
by Professor Erica Chenoweth and Dr. Maria J. Stephan that a
protest event turnout reaching or exceeding 3.5% of the population is especially worrisome to governments.34 Collective action is
essential for the protection of all rights but is much more likely to
accompany certain types of rights, according to Chilton and Versteeg. Their core contribution, which I turn to shortly, is that organizational rights come with organizations that facilitate coordination and collective action, whereas individual rights do not.
But first, some important caveats about the theory of coordination and collective action that Chilton and Versteeg put forward: First, it’s a general theory, not dependent on particular institutional structures. An alternative theory of why constitutional
rights matter, for instance, might be that constitutional rights are
enforced by courts and police forces, and parties behave in the
shadow of powerful and efficient state institutions. Second, it is a
static theory. An alternative, dynamic theory of the influence of
rights might be a one-way ratchet. For example, the first generation of leaders may simply parrot rights language because that’s
what’s expected in polite society of international fora, but a second generation of leaders then grows up with rights discourse everywhere and genuinely believes in human rights, having

32 For related empirical work on the importance of precise wording in the human
rights context, see generally Linos & Pegram, Language of Compromise, supra note 18.
33 CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 32.
34 See ERICA CHENOWETH & MARIA J. STEPHAN, WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS: THE
STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 39–41 (2011).
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internalized this new system of moral values.35 Third, there may
be some missing, implicit assumptions about constitutional, as
opposed to statutory or administrative, protections. On the one
hand, constitutional protections typically have higher status than
protections enshrined in ordinary laws or administrative actions.
At the same time, constitutional protections are often far less precise than other types of rules. Is a vague formulation of very high
status sufficient to allow for what Chilton and Versteeg term “coordination”? Would a vague rule like “always drive on the side of
the road which maximizes safety” or “everyone has a right to free
speech” significantly help an aggrieved party in establishing she
was in the right? I bracket these questions for now, in order to
dive deeper into the key theoretical contribution Chilton and Versteeg offer: the concept of organizational rights.
B. Organizational Versus Individual Rights
Chilton and Versteeg argue that some rights are automatically more likely to be supported by organizations than others.36
Churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and other religious organizations have built-in reasons and built-in mechanisms to
support religious freedoms.37 Unions are designed in order to protect labor rights and may have the tools for this. Political parties
are similarly motivated to protect their continued existence.38
What about the individual rights that organizations help protect? Don’t organizations also spring up around individual rights
such as free speech and freedom from torture? Chilton and Versteeg are very concrete in their response: they propose that while
media organizations often defend the right to free speech, schools
often advocate for the right to education, and hospitals often defend the right to health, these three rights are not organizational.39 Why not? What exactly does an organizational right entail? And why does the category of organizational rights include
both rights traditionally classified as individual rights and rights
traditionally classified as social rights?

35 See THOMAS RISSE, STEPHEN C. ROPP & KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 34 (1999).
36 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 53–56.
37 See id. at 54.
38 See id. at 36–37.
39 See id. at 53–56 (explaining that certain groups lack the member bases, means, or
incentives to defend what the authors define as organizational rights).
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According to Chilton and Versteeg, selective benefits are key
to the protection of organizational rights.40 Trade unions, religious organizations, and political parties offer substantial concrete benefits primarily to their members. In contrast, the ACLU
and other advocacy organizations that protect free speech lack
this built-in mechanism for developing and sustaining a powerful
constituency. Amnesty International and other organizations
that seek to limit unjust imprisonment and torture similarly have
no natural constituency. The thank-you note, the address labels,
and occasional invitation to an event that advocacy organizations
offer to their donors each pale in comparison to the very regular
interactions and material benefits members of unions, political
parties, and religious organizations enjoy.41
They emphasize that organizations have legal personality,
and, to the extent this legal personality is respected without question from states eager to suppress particular activity, this is a
major advantage. As Chilton and Versteeg write:
A group that lacks legal personality has to rely on individual
members to engage in basic transactions such as opening a
bank account, signing a lease, and being able to sue or be
sued, which can expose members to excessive individual liability. Such groups also lack perpetual succession, meaning
that it is difficult for leadership to turn over. They further
cannot conceal members’ identities to shield them from government retaliation.42
Another important insight about organizations is that longestablished organizations are much better at protecting rights
than newly formed protest groups created to resist a particular
aggression. As Chilton and Versteeg’s Polish case study in Chapter 6 illustrates, when an authoritarian government started suppressing dissent, newly formed protest groups weren’t able to resist the incursion.43 I return to this concern in the last part of this
Book Review to speculate about why established groups may be
much better able to handle the challenges of the pandemic than
newly formed coalitions.

40

See id. at 273–74.
For examples of these benefits rendered by organizations, see CHILTON &
VERSTEEG, supra note 3, at 36–37, 54.
42 Id. at 42.
43 See id. at 128–29.
41
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Certainly, there are ways to critique this argument about organizations. For example, in emphasizing the selective benefits
that only some types of organizations can offer, Chilton and Versteeg prioritize the material and concrete over the spiritual and
intangible. Religious organizations, for instance, often promise
both gains in this life and in the other life, and other types of
movements to protect (or suppress) rights similarly seek to attract the “righteous.” Religious movements, human rights advocates, and ethnonationalist groups differ in key ways, but share
in their goal to create organizations in which people can find
belonging, purpose, and connectedness, in addition to material
advantages. At the end of the day, however, and despite this and
many other potential caveats, I agree with Chilton and Versteeg
that it might be that certain rights are much easier to organize
around than others. As their argument is not only a theoretical
one, but also one deeply grounded in empirics, persons more skeptical about the plausibility of their thesis can dig deep in their
data to see what support they find.44
III. HOW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MATTER: THE EMPIRICAL
CONTRIBUTION
Chilton and Versteeg use a mixed-method approach—an approach that combines the breadth of quantitative research with
the depth of qualitative case studies—to probe their claim. While
mixed methods are strongly preferred over other techniques in
many social sciences these days,45 carrying them out well remains
very challenging. Chilton and Versteeg’s quantitative analysis
represents a model of transparency, while their well-chosen and
gripping case studies give context and color and mechanisms.

44 See id. at 339–68 (providing regression results summarizing four comparisons
used to assess the relationship between de jure constitutional rights and de facto respect
for those rights; and reporting the results of a series of nine additional regressions, with
complex model specifications, that explore the robustness of the authors’ primary results
for each right).
45 See generally James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Integrating Qualitative and
Quantitative Method, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 758 (Janet
M. Box-Steffensmeier et al. eds., 2008) (noting the importance of mixed methods in the
field of social science research). See also JOHN W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN:
QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS APPROACHES 43–44 (4th ed. 2014)
(discussing the strengths of mixed method studies).
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A. Quantitative Contribution
Quantitative research, while not always deep, is often broad.
Breadth is a major contribution when little is known about foreign legal systems, and when we suspect that the countries we
know best are systematically different than those on which little
sunlight shines. Simply put, authoritarian states, and states with
limited capacity, are both less likely to protect rights and less
likely to be transparent to outsiders. When we look for our keys
under the light post—and this light shines on a handful of
wealthy democracies—our conclusions are very likely to be biased. In a very surprising and counterintuitive finding, for example,
Chilton and Versteeg report that democracy and judicial institutions are not always linked to greater respect for rights—this
comes as a big surprise to those of us who are less familiar with
authoritarian regimes.46
To start, by creating a careful dataset on constitutions from
around the world, validating it against other similar projects, and
making it accessible to researchers online, the authors have already made a huge contribution to the field.47 In this project, Chilton and Versteeg then use a cutting-edge empirical strategy to
estimate how enforcement varies depending on the right in question. For every right, they present both simple cuts of the data
(before/after, presence/absence) and sophisticated stacked event
studies.48 This approach is a model of transparency, letting critics
easily access their data and identify any limitations.
There are many reasons for which Chilton and Versteeg’s empirical strategy serves as a model of transparency. To start, much
of it is simple. While complicated adjustments are often necessary
to sort through complex, multicausal processes, starting off with
presence/absence and before/after charts very much helps situate
the reader. It also limits the extent to which unstated empirical
assumptions hidden in complex regression specifications can
drive the results. Second, the technique the authors use is consistent. Showing the same four figures for multiple rights again
imposes major constraints on the authors’ ability to fit the data to
their theory, while also making it easier for the reader to make
comparisons across rights discussed in different book chapters.
46

See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 49–50.
Data for this project is available at www.constitutions.org. A parallel contribution,
The Comparative Constitutions Project Dataset, pioneered by Professors Zachary Elkins,
Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, is available at www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
48 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 106–07.
47
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Third, these simple analyses are robust to alternative formulations. Notably, Chilton and Versteeg used stacked event studies
for their book and related articles analyzing the same data.49
Stacked event studies allow for the inclusion of multiple control
variables.50 The use of many variables helps ensure that the actual comparability of subjects—rather than idiosyncratic regression model assumptions—drives the results.51 Fourth, the
analyses are visually appealing. Placing many figures and maps
in the book itself, and reserving regression tables for the appendices, represents best practice.
Even though this book represents the best that is currently
possible in cross-country quantitative analysis, it is still subject
to limitations inherent to the genre, which Chilton and Versteeg
readily acknowledge.52 Notably, we simply lack high-quality, consistent data about many features of the world that we care about;
this data challenge is compounded when we seek to compare
across all countries of the world, and when we seek to go back to
the time when constitutions were introduced or amended. This is
a challenge that international organizations have been fighting
for some time and are now further prioritizing. To take one example, the 2018 Global Compact for Migration lists as its very
first objective to “[c]ollect and utilize accurate and disaggregated
data as a basis for evidence-based policies.”53 Policy makers
around the world are now coming to the conclusion that data collection must be prioritized to address urgent international challenges, and investing the resources necessary for this work.
An important way to make sense of the world while we still
lack consistent, high-quality data is to supplement cross-national
quantitative comparisons with in-depth, qualitative case studies,
so I turn to this next.
B. Qualitative Analyses
There has been very extensive progress on the qualitative
methods front, and fields that were once criticized as being merely
49 See id. at 106–12; Chilton & Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, supra note 23, at 580; Chilton & Versteeg, Torture Prohibitions, supra note 23, at
424–31.
50 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 106–10.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 100–13.
53 Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.231/3 (July 30, 2018).

742

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:729

descriptive—failing to identify concrete causal mechanisms—now
have succeeded in persuading hard-edged quantitative scholars
about why mixed methods are often essential in the study of diverse human institutions.54 This is especially important in crossnational comparison. To start, the unit of analysis, be it the state
or the minority group or the particular right at issue, is far from
homogeneous. To continue, there is so much that can be done with
case studies, not only to accurately describe but also to assess
causal claims.
Chilton and Versteeg do exactly this: they conduct multiple
case studies—and use within-case analysis—to develop an account of how organizational rights operate in practice.55 To identify causal-process observations, the authors go far beyond the
constitutional text, employing a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. By weighing available evidence against specific
propositions, Chilton and Versteeg effectively support their general claim that organizations are critical to the realization of
rights, and their specific thesis that organizational rights are different from other rights. They show us how legal scholars can develop temporally linked propositions with distinctive empirical
signatures, and how evaluating these propositions against available evidence can substantially increase their persuasiveness.
Good case study scholarship starts with careful case selection.56 Chilton and Versteeg do this masterfully. For example, in
Chapter 7, which focuses on social rights, the focus is helpfully on
Colombia.57 This follows the principles of most difficult case design—meaning the authors have selected cases where their hypothesis is most likely to fail.58 Colombia presents a difficult case
for Chilton and Versteeg’s theory that social rights are not easily
enforced because the Colombian judiciary actively enforces social

54 See Linos & Carlson, supra note 26, at 214–15 (describing the pitfalls of legal
scholars relying too heavily on qualitative methodology or on doctrinal analysis tools that
lead to overreliance on groundbreaking yet “idiosyncratic” cases; and advocating for a mix
of these and quantitative methods); Linos, supra note 26, at 484 (arguing similarly that
“[w]hile case selection principles . . . are useful starting points, they are unlikely to fully
confirm or disconfirm a causal claim involving cross-country comparisons”).
55 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 115–19.
56 See Linos & Carlson, supra note 26, at 217–19 (discussing qualitative techniques
for selecting desirable cases). See generally Linos, supra note 26 (detailing methodologies
for case selection to achieve various ends, such as case selection to establish causation or
case selection to establish generality).
57 See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 192–206.
58 See Linos & Carlson, supra note 26, at 225–26.
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rights.59 Famously, in The Hollow Hope, Professor Gerald N. Rosenberg argued that the U.S. Supreme Court was far less influential in bringing about social change than commonly believed.60 He
made a huge stir in the academy and beyond, even though he discussed just two cases. These two cases, Brown v. Board of Education,61 establishing a constitutional right to desegregated schools,
and Roe v. Wade,62 establishing a constitutional right to abortion,
were not only highly significant, but they were the two most difficult cases for his argument about the Supreme Court’s limited
relevance.63
Similarly, Chilton and Versteeg, in arguing that social and
economic rights, and the right to health in particular, are not well
protected by constitutions, pick an example of a country with a
particularly activist judiciary engaged in enforcing and developing health care rights. By focusing on a constitutional court celebrated for its health care jurisprudence—and flagging the important limitations of this court—Chilton and Versteeg build on
their argument that enforcement of the right to health care is particularly challenging.
The second, equally critical step to excellent qualitative work
is within-case analysis.64 A detective does not rely on statistical
generalizations of the type “crime is often committed by young
men, therefore this old woman cannot be guilty,” but instead, she
relies on a series of theories with testable propositions and, ideally, distinctive, fingerprint-like (or DNA-like) empirical signatures. Likewise, the careful qualitative scholar seeks to identify
motive and opportunity and track down very different types of
evidence for each individual case. Action is just as important as
inaction. For instance, Chilton and Versteeg point to the dog that
didn’t bark because its rights were not threatened: they discuss
how for many years, the Russian Orthodox Church never even
had to assert its rights, because even as President Vladimir Putin
sought total control of the state, this organization was too
59

See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 172.
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
61 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63 See ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 340.
64 See GARY GOERTZ & JAMES MAHONEY, A TALE OF TWO CULTURES: QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 87–90 (2012) (explaining that
within-case analysis is beneficial for qualitative studies because it allows researchers to
explain particular outcomes of individual cases with authority).
60
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powerful to challenge.65 This case presents a convincing example
of when organizational rights may be uniquely protected through
the power of the organization.
As the world changes radically around us, and the rise of authoritarianism is compounded by a pandemic that gives cover to
leaders of all stripes to implement their preferred policies, historical and comparative work becomes essential. As Professor Martha Minow puts it, “[t]o be able to imagine how the world could be
different from the way it is, this is what study of history, comparative law and even science fiction can offer.”66 In the last part of
this Book Review, I therefore turn to insights we can draw from
How Constitutional Rights Matter to better understand our current predicament.
IV. RIGHTS IN CRISES: HAVE ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS FARED
BETTER THAN OTHER RIGHTS IN THE PANDEMIC?
Jean Monnet, a founding father of the European Union, argued that “Europe would be built through crises, and that it
would be the sum of their solutions.”67 More recently, at the beginning of the Great Recession, then–White House Chief of Staff
Rahm Emanuel emphasized, “You never want a serious crisis to
go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do
things that you think you could not do before.”68 And as the United
States started pandemic lockdowns, comedian Trevor Noah emphasized that while many Americans took the opportunity to
start baking, President Donald Trump also pursued his favorite
hobby: the implementation of immigration restrictions.69 Politicians have been using crises as opportunities for long enough that
the “garbage can” model of politics is now widely taught. As Professor John Kingdon explains, activists, think tanks, lobbyists,

65

See CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 2, at 231–33, 243–44, 332–33.
Emily Newburger, ‘What Justice Demands of Us, No One Person Can Do Alone.’
Looking Back and Ahead with Martha Minow, HARV. L. BULL. (May 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/N3DY-AUQB.
67 JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRS 417 (1978).
68 Viveca Novak, Bum Rap for Rahm, FACTCHECK.ORG (Jan. 13, 2011),
https://perma.cc/Y7ZE-6J3N.
69 See Trish Bendix, Some Bake During Lockdown. Trump Bans Immigrants, Trevor
Noah Notes., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/7REQ-8EGA; see also Caitlin
Dickerson & Michael D. Shear, Before COVID-19, Trump Aide Sought to Use Disease to
Close Borders, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/GMG9-QC8Y (indicating that
long before COVID-19 started, top President Trump aide Stephen Miller sought to try to
restrict immigration on public health grounds).
66
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and politicians work on their ideas for decades, and only when the
right opportunity arises and a crisis or other event opens up a
“policy window” do such ideas get translated into policy.70
A. The Pandemic
The global pandemic is an extraordinary policy window, and
leaders around the world have used it to put in place previously
unimaginable reforms. Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary
first used COVID-19 as cover to start ruling by decree,71 and then
started to restrict a wide variety of rights, including transgender
rights, in ways entirely unrelated to the pandemic.72 Hungary was
not alone: elections were delayed in Bolivia, courts were closed in
Israel, and journalists were intimidated in Thailand and Jordan,
to name but a few examples.73 In contrast, Chancellor Angela
Merkel of Germany has used the COVID-19 crisis to push forward
unprecedented reforms in the direction of further EU integration
and North-South solidarity.74 This involves an $857 billion stimulus package, in which the poorer southern EU countries benefit
both from the issuance of collective debt, backed by their northern
neighbors, and by receiving much of this assistance in the form of
grants, not loans.75 Jointly issued debt was discussed a decade
earlier in the course of the Great Recession but was considered
extraordinarily radical. In short: the pandemic has provided unprecedented opportunities for politicians of diverse ideologies to
implement policy reforms that were previously considered beyond
the realm of possibility.
The pandemic also constitutes a hard test of the Chilton and
Versteeg thesis. Amidst a global emergency that has led many
countries to implement widespread rights restrictions, are organizational rights more likely to prove robust to threats than individual rights? In answering this question, it is helpful to distinguish between rights restrictions that represent minimum
70

See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 174–75 (1984).
See Benjamin Novak & Patrick Kingsley, Hungary’s Leader Grabbed Powers to
Fight the Virus. Some Fear Other Motives., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020),
https://perma.cc/9ZP3-K7Y7.
72 See Benjamin Novak, Hungary Outlaws Changing Gender on Documents After
Birth, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/5778-MX6G.
73 See Selam Gebrekidan, For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to
Grab Even More Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/J8H7-EGVF.
74 See Matina Stevis-Gridneff, E.U. Adopts Groundbreaking Stimulus to Fight Coronavirus Recession, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/95TS-GXVZ.
75 See id.
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restrictions necessary to combat the virus, and power grabs in
which governments use the pandemic as a pretext to entrench unrelated policies. International law, human rights law, and many
countries’ constitutional rules on the derogation of human rights
provide a helpful conceptual framework for this distinction. An
appropriate derogation requires the existence of a threat to the
life of a nation, a formal declaration, and a recognition that some
rights can never be suspended.76 Moreover, an appropriate derogation requires that restrictions be lifted when the emergency
ends, and, just as a limitation, requires that all restrictions be
related and proportional to the emergency.77 A rights restriction
which is excessive relative to the emergency, and thus violates
human rights law, is not always put in place by an authoritarian
government eager to grab more power. Democratic governments
can often violate rights by being overly cautious in responding to
COVID-19, for example, or by allocating too little funding in ordinary or crisis times, as a large jurisprudence on social and economic rights explains.
Human rights jurisprudence on pandemics can add precision
on which rights are appropriately restricted, and which rights are
unnecessarily curtailed, perhaps, as Chilton and Versteeg argue,
because they lack robust organizational protection. Pandemic jurisprudence emphasizes, for example, that quarantines are permissible even though they severely restrict freedom of movement.
For example, Article 5, Section 1(e) of the European Convention
on Human Rights permits “the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases” as long as this
is in “accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”78 Indeed,
courts have upheld quarantines that include, in extreme cases,
compulsory involuntary detention.79
1. Civil and political rights.
Civil and political rights, such as freedom of movement, are
rights that lack inherent organizational support in the Chilton
76

See generally David Kretzmer, State of Emergency, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
Audrey Lebret, COVID-19 Pandemic and Derogation to Human Rights, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 1 (2020).
77 See generally Kretzmer, supra note 76; Lebret, supra note 76; Laurence Helfer,
Rethinking Derogations from Human Rights Treaties, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (2021) (reviewing the system of limitations and derogations post-COVID-19).
78 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5
§ (1)(e), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
79 See, e.g., Enhorn v. Sweden, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 97.
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008);
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and Versteeg typology. In the COVID-19 era, freedom of movement
is restricted in unprecedented ways; not only are international
borders effectively closed to noncitizens in much of the world, but
over 133 countries have also imposed internal controls on movement.80 Moreover, many states have derogated from the right of
assembly.81 While extraordinary in scope, these restrictions on individual rights in response to COVID-19 do not seem, at first
glance, obviously unnecessary and inappropriate.
At the same time, many governments are putting in place
COVID-19-related censorship efforts, which often take the form
of restrictions on fake news and limit freedom of expression.82 In
the hands of authoritarian governments, such restrictions often
far exceed in scope any plausible pandemic-related rationale. But
even when implemented by well-meaning democratic governments, information restrictions in times of crisis can often backfire by creating mistrust in officials and opening up space for selfinterested information brokers to tell alternative narratives.83
Other restrictions on individual freedoms that authoritarian
states, such as Venezuela, are implementing include using the
pandemic as pretext to prosecute critics and abuse detainees.84
This may be a more generalized phenomenon. Information on torture is not readily available, but the UN Anti-Torture mechanisms warn that the pandemic has greatly exacerbated the illtreatment of prisoners, that tens of thousands of prisoners have
already contracted COVID-19 as of mid-June 2020, and these
numbers are sure to rise.85

80

See Slipowitz, supra note 7.
See generally LAWS ON THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY WORLDWIDE,
DEROGATIONS BY STATES PARTIES FROM ARTICLE 21 ICCPR, ARTICLE 11 ECHR, AND
ARTICLE 15 ACHR ON THE BASIS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020); Lebret, supra note 76.
82 See Jacob Mchangama & Sarah McLaughlin, Coronavirus Has Started a Censorship Pandemic, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/BZ8Z-8HS6.
83 See, e.g., Melissa Carlson, Laura Jakli & Katerina Linos, Rumors and Refugees:
How Government-Created Information Vacuums Undermine Effective Crisis Management,
62 INT’L STUD. Q. 671, 682 (2018) [hereinafter Carlson et al., Rumors and Refugees] (explaining how international organization and government policies restricting information
flows to migrants and refugees backfired by making smugglers key information providers);
Melissa Carlson, Laura Jakli & Katerina Linos, Refugees Misdirected: How Information,
Misinformation and Rumors Shape Refugees’ Access to Fundamental Rights, 57 VA. J.
INT’L L. 539, 568–69 (2017) [hereinafter Carlson et al., Refugees Misdirected].
84 See Venezuela: A Police State Lashes Out Amid COVID-19, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Aug. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/6JD2-2QTN.
85 See COVID-19 Exacerbates the Risk of Ill-Treatment and Torture Worldwide, supra note 8.
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2. Social rights.
In addition to civil and political rights, social rights have also
been significantly restricted during the COVID-19 crisis. Let us
look to two: the rights to education and health care. Chilton and
Versteeg classify these as nonorganizational rights, as they are
primarily enjoyed and defended by individuals. The right to education has undoubtedly been severely restricted around the globe.
UNESCO reports that most governments around the world have
temporarily closed schools.86 UNESCO makes an interactive map
available, which illustrates how this varies at different times in
the pandemic.87 School closures peaked in April 2020—when 166
states had countrywide school closures impacting over 1.6 billion
learners.88 As of January 2021, UNESCO estimated that globally,
on average, students had lost two-thirds of an academic year due
to school closures.89 The right to health care is also directly and
severely compromised by the pandemic, and by government decisions on how to manage the pandemic. For some governments,
the pandemic seems like a wake-up call, and there is at least the
stated intention to increase investments in health and strengthen
health infrastructures.90
In short: nonorganizational rights are massively restricted
during the pandemic. Every civil and political right examined in
the Chilton and Versteeg volume has been severely curtailed, including freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of
speech, and the prohibition against torture. It is not at all clear
that these last two sets of restrictions are in any way justifiable,
as they do not appear to be related and proportional to the
COVID-19 emergency and because freedom from torture is a nonderogable right. Likewise, many social rights have been limited.
Some of these restrictions—like restrictions on the right of
free movement—seem entirely appropriate (for now) and are popularly supported.91 Yet it does seem very possible that other
86

See Education: From Disruption to Recovery, supra note 9.
See id.
88 See id.
89 UNESCO Figures Show Two Thirds of an Academic Year Lost on Average Worldwide Due to Covid-19 School Closures, UNESCO (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/KTU6-SMXM.
90 See Julia L. Marcus & Joshua Barocas, The Coronavirus Pandemic Could Transform Our Health Care System—for the Better, STAT (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/NR6X-BJTW.
91 See All Things Considered, Many Americans Willing to Trade Some Civil Liberties
to Combat Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/YU4L-TLJ2.
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restrictions, such as restrictions on the right to education, would
be more forcefully resisted if students and parents generally, and
working mothers in particular, were better organized. I develop
this claim below.
3. Beyond the pandemic.
Are organizational rights more robust than individual rights
in this time of crisis? Are freedom of religion, unionization, and
the right to form political parties more robust because of their organizational character? Freedom of religion is impacted through
restrictions on all types of gatherings, including religious gatherings, though religious groups have often sought, and sometimes
obtained, exemptions.92 Political rights are restricted during the
pandemic, as governments postpone elections and put in place
other vote suppression measures,93 but it does not seem that organizational rights to form parties are under global threat.94 Core
labor union goals, such as widespread employment at good pay
and under safe conditions, are under threat globally as the pandemic
coincides with widespread business closures. But new restrictions
on union activity don’t seem to be widely implemented globally,
and some unions are showing renewed strength by pressing for
health and safety measures and, in some cases, reduced hours of
work.95
A broad overview of rights restrictions can’t give us a clear
answer yet. It is too early to tell because, at present, every right
studied in the Chilton and Versteeg book, organizational and nonorganizational alike, is restricted. Some of these restrictions are
appropriate, while others involve clearly excessive and pretextual
measures. Some restrictions may, unfortunately, become permanent, and by outlasting the pandemic, reveal their pretextual
character. Also, so far, it is not the case that organizational rights
are respected uniformly, while individual rights are widely
curtailed.
92 See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the Pandemic 31–36, 51 (Va. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Rsch. Paper No. 2020-52; Univ.
of Chi., Working Paper No. 747, 2020) (describing judicial rulings on different nations’
restrictions of public gatherings).
93 See Kevin Townsend, Voter Suppression by Pandemic, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/QYX7-WMUU.
94 See Anatoly Kurmanaev, Latin America Is Facing a ‘Decline of Democracy’ Under
the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/YV89-QYBC.
95 See Eliza Berkon, The Pandemic Is Inspiring a Wave of Unionization Efforts. Will
It Lead to Greater Protections?, WAMU 88.5 (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/JAU8-ED9E.
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That said, because Chilton and Versteeg explain the mechanisms through which their theory operates, it is possible to take
a closer look at whether their proposed mechanisms are already
at work. By deepening this thought experiment and more closely
comparing two rights, the right to religion and the right to education, it is possible to identify the value of organizations. This comparison offers some support for the Chilton/Versteeg thesis. More
specifically, I will argue that in the face of unprecedented challenges, religious organizations, unlike student and parental organizations, have been able to articulate shared positions and
fight for them through direct political representation, protests,
and litigation.
B. Case Study: Education and Religious Rights
I compare the right to religion and the right to education because they are often exercised, and restricted, in similar ways.
That is, it is common for both religious and educational services
to take place in groups. In the pandemic, many group activities
are restricted, so as we compare the two rights, the question is
whether, for moderate levels of COVID-19 risk, we see different
restrictions and different protests in response to these restrictions.
Comparing two rights, one organizational and the other nonorganizational, that are otherwise similar is a useful case-selection
strategy. This follows Mill’s “most similar case” design so often
used in qualitative and quantitative social science.96 But as no two
cases are ever sufficiently similar, it is important to combine careful case selection with within-case analysis, also known as process
tracing.97 Process tracing requires that a theory not only has an
end point and a conclusion, but also specific mechanisms. A
scholar then looks for evidence of these mechanisms or intermediate steps.
In the Chilton and Versteeg account, two mechanisms—information and collective action—are critical to the robustness of
organizational rights. During crises, information dissemination is
critical, and governments, by delaying in its production or by being untrustworthy, often create information vacuums ripe for exploitation.98 Are religious organizations, or student and parental
96 See generally Linos & Carlson, supra note 26. See also Linos, supra note 26, at
481–82.
97 See Linos & Carlson, supra note 26, at 231–32.
98 See Carlson et al., Rumors and Refugees, supra note 83, at 682 (identifying frequent policy shifts, limits on information dissemination, and ad-hoc policy implementation
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organizations, able to step into this information space to articulate for their members whether their rights are being respected
or not? When faced with new threats, who is better able to articulate a collective position, religious organizations or student and
parent organizations? And once a position is articulated, who is
better able to fight for it?
1. Right to religion.
While COVID-19 has come with major restrictions on the
rights of religious communities,99 we also see extraordinary efforts on the parts of these communities to preserve the right to
worship communally. In contrast, there seems to be minimal organizational effort on the part of students and parents, and in
particular working mothers, to keep schools open. This is puzzling
for a number of reasons. To start, there seems to be ample evidence that churches have greatly contributed to the spread of
COVID-19,100 and some evidence that schools are not major contributors to the spread of the virus.101 There is also ample evidence
that school closures harm children. Finally, unlike prisoners,
whose ability to organize collectively to vindicate their rights is
sharply limited, parents have, and could again use, their numerical and socioeconomic power to advance collective claims. They
don’t seem to be doing this.
Sometimes, religious organizations are successful in having
their claims vindicated. For example, in the United States, most

as common crisis-management tools that create information vacuums and space for disinformation); Carlson et al., Refugees Misdirected, supra note 83, at 568–69.
99 For one example of a major religious restriction on a majority community, see Hajj
2020: What You Need to Know About This Year’s Pilgrimage, AL JAZEERA (July 25, 2020),
https://perma.cc/9D32-RMBR (reporting on the cancellation of the Hajj for pilgrims from
outside Saudi Arabia that impacted millions of Muslims). See also Ben Hubbard & Declan
Walsh, The Hajj Pilgrimage Is Canceled, and Grief Rocks the Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/DQM2-SL8A. For additional examples on how COVID19 restrictions have impacted minority religious communities, see generally Scott Weiner,
Kirsten Lavery & Dominic Nardi, The Global Response to the Coronavirus: Impact on Religious Practice and Religious Freedom, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
https://perma.cc/2X4B-M4V2.
100 See Kate Conger, Jack Healy & Lucy Tompkins, Churches Were Eager to Reopen.
Now They Are Confronting Coronavirus Cases., N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/T77V-YXPM.
101 See Dyani Lewis, Why Schools Probably Aren’t COVID Hotspots, NATURE (Oct. 29,
2020), https://perma.cc/LYZ4-W7Y3.
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states have religious exemptions to COVID-19 social distancing
rules.102
To take another example, a decision of the Israeli government
to avoid another national lockdown by heavily restricting
movement primarily in cities with high virus volumes failed
when it turned out that the vast majority of these cities turned
out to be Arab or ultra-Orthodox.103 The political clout of ultraOrthodox leaders, with separate organizational structures, was
critical in having the government of Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu reverse course to pay closer attention to constitutional
rights.104 Sometimes, however, religious organizations fail.105
2. Right to education and health care.
But student organizations, parent organizations, and workingwomen organizations don’t even seem to be trying hard to keep
schools open. This is very puzzling, as in many countries parents
are a numerically and economically powerful group, and yet they
have no national organizations or other infrastructure through
which to formulate and fight for collective claims. Working mothers could have organized to keep schools open and to keep their
jobs. But in all countries for which the International Labour Organization (ILO) has data, workforce participation declined more
sharply for women than for men during the pandemic, in part because of heightened care responsibilities disproportionately
shouldered by women.106
Working women have organized very successfully in the past;
indeed, it is no accident that the first ILO Convention established
the eight-hour workday, the second ILO Convention established
unemployment insurance, and the third ILO Convention established maternity leave. These three critical conventions date from
1919, the year of the organization’s founding. One hundred years

102 See Virginia Villa, Most States Have Religious Exemptions to COVID-19 Social
Distancing Rules, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/D7MG-A4AV.
103 See David M. Halbfinger & Isabel Kershner, Israel’s Virus Czar Was Making Headway. Then He Tangled with a Key Netanyahu Ally, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4UM8-FR47.
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020) (denying injunctive relief for a church seeking an exception to state gathering restrictions); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020) (same);
High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 141 S. Ct. 527, 527 (2020) (same).
106 See The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Jobs and Incomes in G20 Economies, INT’L LAB. ORG. 3 (2020).
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later, with women’s workforce participation so much better established, it is shocking we are still resorting to privatized solutions,
rather than organizational action, to address school closures.107
These individual, privatized solutions often involve the unpaid
work of (primarily) female family members or the private hiring
of tutors, and further sharpen gender, class, and race inequities.108
In describing education and health care as individual rights,
Chilton and Versteeg suggest while organization on the part of
students could theoretically be advanced through schools and
that organization on the part of patients could theoretically be
advanced through hospitals, this will rarely happen. One inference that can be fairly drawn from their work is that, when push
comes to shove, both schools and hospitals will prioritize their employees. The pandemic does offer some support for this conjecture.
In the course of the pandemic, teacher and parent positions have
often conflicted, with teachers seeking remote instruction and
shorter hours, and parents seeking in-person instruction and
more extensive hours. To the extent that schools could have provided an organizational framework to protect students’ rights to
education, it seems that they are functioning, at least in some
parts of the world, with teachers’ interests top-of-mind.109 This too
is very much consistent with Chilton and Versteeg’s emphasis on
organizational rights, as it is teachers’ success at unionizing that
107 See KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 8–9 (2013); Mona L.
Siegel, The Forgotten Origins of Paid Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/NTJ5-8ZUE.
108 Pandemic pods, which are small groups of families who work together to continue
their children’s education at home, are one example of privatized solutions. For those privileged families who can create and sustain them, pandemic pods are at best suboptimal
solutions to school closures, as they make privatized compromises which threaten to significantly set back both public education and women’s workforce gains, as well as dramatically widen inequalities. These compromises are in large part an organizational failure.
See Emma Goldberg, The Pandemic’s Setbacks for Working Moms, N.Y. TIMES (July 2,
2020), https://perma.cc/MKA5-SETV. Admittedly, if parents were better organized,
wealthy families would have benefitted the most. Indeed, it is typical for certain in-groups
to benefit more from the exercise of organizational rights at the expense of other individuals. Yet the absence of any form of organizing means the rights of all individuals go unprotected, as illustrated by parents’ lack of organization that has impacted both wealthy
and low-income parents—albeit to differing degrees, because of the availability of privatized solutions like pandemic pods for wealthy families.
109 See Dana Goldstein & Elizabeth Shapiro, Online School Demands More of Teachers. Unions Are Pushing Back., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/LK24-LFJB
(emphasizing that teachers are opting for work from home and reduced contact hours);
Benjamin Herold & Holly Kurtz, Teachers Work Two Hours Less Per Day During COVID19: 8 Key EdWeek Survey Findings, EDUC. WK. (May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/J7ZH-9QKW.
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contributes greatly to their ability to have their voices heard. Similarly, when there is conflict in the exercise of religious rights
among minority and majority groups, it is the best organized who
typically triumphs.
To conclude, while rights of all types are widely restricted at
present, the pandemic and postpandemic world are illustrating
anew the value of organizations such as unions, religious groups,
and political parties to bring together people and seek collective
benefits, at least for organization members, in times when collective action is urgently needed. In comparing the right to education
and the right to freely practice religion, it is clear that both are
restricted in important ways. But whereas churches, mosques,
and synagogues are fighting these restrictions through political
representation and through litigation, parents are not organizing
collectively to pressure the state. In one study of litigation in the
face of the pandemic, lawsuits by religious organizations were
commonplace, whereas lawsuits by parent groups were rare.110
When parents adopt private solutions, instead of organizing to
pressure the state for collective solutions, they are not only taking
on short-term costs, but also may be contributing to the deterioration of children’s education, women’s employment, and a broad
range of societal inequalities for years to come.
CONCLUSION
Whereas constitutional law scholarship might assume that
rights, once put on paper in a constitution, generate protections
by themselves, law and social science work emphasize legal mobilization as necessary for rights protection. Chilton and Versteeg
move us beyond this scholarship, both by changing the dependent
variable from litigation and conflict to enforcement, and by changing the organization from an institution focused on conflict to an
institution focused on providing tailored benefits to its members.
One innovation in Chilton and Versteeg’s How Constitutional
Rights Matter comes from their emphasis that sometimes, organizations are so strong that governments don’t even think to challenge their rights.
Chilton and Versteeg are transforming several fields. They
are raising the bar in constitutional law theory by explaining how
individual rights and organizational structures connect in a
110
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systematic way across very diverse national landscapes. They are
documenting how best to answer empirical questions in comparative and international law, even when there exist multiple theories that are consistent with key facts about the world. Their data
presentation is a model of transparency. But most of all, Chilton
and Versteeg have put forth a theory that already seems to stand
the test of time, by helping explain the post-pandemic world.

